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THE SECRET LIFE OF IAN FLEMING: SPIES, LIES AND 
SOCIAL TIES 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article explores the fascinating interactions and experiences of James Bond 
creator, Ian Fleming, with the real world of intelligence. It has long been known that 
Fleming worked in Naval Intelligence during the Second World War. However, 
accounts of his time there tend to portray him as a lowly and slightly eccentric 
administrator. Drawing on newly-discovered archival materials, plus memoirs and 
histories, it is argued here that Fleming was a respected and influential figure in the 
great game of espionage for some three decades. During the war, he was a central 
cog in the machinery of naval intelligence: planning operations; working with 
partners in American intelligence; and liaising with secret Whitehall departments, 
including the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park. Before and 
after the war, he was involved in a range of intelligence networks, often using 
journalistic cover to hide his clandestine connections. Throughout his life, his social 
circle was a ‘who’s who’ of spies and saboteurs, including CIA Director Allen 
Dulles. In short, he straddled the state-private divide. Taken together, these dealings 
with real intelligence paved the way for and gave veracity to his fiction, which 
continues to shape public perceptions of intelligence to this day.    
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It has long been known that Ian Fleming, the creator of James Bond, worked in British Naval 
Intelligence during the Second World War. Published on 13 April 1953, his first novel, 
Casino Royale, included a potted biography mentioning this fact. Moreover, he liked to hint 
at his wartime skulduggery in letters to fans and well-wishers.1 Less well known, however, is 
what tasks he performed and how important these and other real intelligence experiences 
were in influencing his creation of 007. The conventional wisdom suggests that he was fairly 
low on the organizational flowchart, a thirty-something upstart within the hallowed walls of 
the Admiralty, working in a backroom with no access to real secrets. John Sutherland has 
written disparagingly that ‘all he commanded was in-trays, out-trays and ashtrays’.2 John 
Pearson’s excellent biography tells us that Fleming liked to inflate his importance by carrying 
a commando knife, engraved with his name and rank, and insinuating darkly that it served 
him well in the field. In reality, he simply used it for opening letters and cutting his 
fingernails.3 Fleming’s friends unkindly dubbed him a ‘chocolate sailor’ – a jibe repeated by 
newspaper magnate Lord Beaverbrook – who never served at sea or saw battle on a ship.4 
Mockingly, they accused him of sitting behind a desk all day, concocting fanciful ploys to 
stick it to Hitler that were immediately dismissed by his exasperated superiors. Strikingly, 
whereas the espionage experiences of more ‘serious’ writers of spy fiction such as Graham 
Greene, Somerset Maugham, and John le Carré are generally held in high regard by 
historians, who portray them as professionals that made a difference,5 Fleming has been cast 
as a ‘rank amateur’ and pen pusher.6 
This assessment stands in need of significant revision. In the public domain, there 
now exists archival material relating to Fleming’s intelligence experiences. This information 
about his secret life includes declassified government records but also several collections of 
private papers, composed of unpublished personal diaries, correspondence and clippings 
written by people who knew or interacted with him. Interestingly, a great deal of this material 
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has been publicly accessible for some time. The question of why it has remained largely 
under-utilised is open to speculation, but might be because it is fragmentary in nature and 
dispersed across multiple locations, internationally, meaning that the researcher has to 
perform the role of scavenger or beachcomber (or even secret agent!) to access it. Sadly, 
there is no single ‘Fleming Archive’; rather, there is a mass of what social historian Raphael 
Samuel once described as ‘thin shrivelled tissues’ that can be held in the hand.7 In addition to 
this disparate documentary spoor, there also exists a spate of intelligence memoirs and 
popular histories, both old and new, many of which contain nuggets of revealing information 
about his spy connections.8 
Drawing on these publications, as well as the scattered archival record, this article 
will demonstrate that Fleming was far more involved at the sharp end of the spy war than he 
has been given credit. As personal assistant to Admiral John Godfrey, the hard-driving 
Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), he was entrusted with many of the nation’s vital 
secrets, including the holiest of holies, that of codebreaking at Bletchley Park. With a sharp 
mind, the right connections, and the inimitable confidence of an Old Etonian, he was given 
responsibilities and privileges that far exceeded his title of personal assistant, including the 
running of agents and the devising of special operations (or ‘plots’ as he called them).9 
Despite his youth and raffish ways, he was an expert to whom senior figures, on both sides of 
the Atlantic, trusted and looked to for assistance and inspiration. He even participated in 
meetings of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which oversaw and gave direction to all 
aspects of Britain’s national security.  
Advancing the existing literature in another direction, it will be argued that Fleming’s 
intelligence ‘career’ went well beyond the Second World War, spanning some three decades. 
In the 1930s, it will be shown that he put his Russian language skills to good use with some 
freelance spy work in Moscow, earning praise from the Foreign Office. After 1945, as he 
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matured into an internationally renowned author, he enjoyed close links with a range of 
senior intelligence officers, both serving and retired, most notably Director of Central 
Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles who was not only a fan, but also remarkably sought his 
counsel on the intelligence challenges of the day. Fleming even had a flattering nickname for 
Dulles – ‘Agent 008’.10 
Beyond the largely self-evident value of providing new insights on a figure of 
enduring public fascination, a full and accurate exploration of Fleming’s secret past is 
valuable because, as historian David Cannadine has written, it gave him an insider’s view of 
the obscure half-lit work of intelligence and ‘It was out of these experiences, memories, and 
sensations that he would later create and elaborate the world of James Bond’.11 Indeed, it was 
while working for Naval Intelligence in 1944 that he told a friend that, after demobilisation, 
he would ‘write the spy story to end all spy stories’.12 Later in life, with characteristic 
aplomb, he declared that: ‘I extracted the Bond plots from my wartime memories, dolled 
them up, attached a hero, a villain, and there was the book’.13  For more than 50 years, the 
James Bond phenomenon has been instrumental in creating a powerful cultural imaginary of 
intelligence, which, rightly or wrongly, and not without disapproval from certain intelligence 
professionals and literary critics, has helped to shape public perceptions of spying around the 
world.14 For tens of millions of people, as le Carré once remarked, albeit through gritted 
teeth, ‘Spy meant Bond’.15 Accordingly, it is important to understand in its fullest context 
how this thick signifier of meaning about intelligence came to be and tease out the curious 
co-constitutive nature of the interconnections between Fleming, Bond, and ‘real’ secret 
intelligence.     
 
 
I 
5 
 
 
 
Ian Fleming was born on 28 May 1908 into a family of great wealth and influence connected 
to the successful merchant bank Robert Fleming & Co. His father, Valentine, was 
Conservative Member of Parliament for Henley from 1910 and, until his death on the 
Western Front in 1917, was a good friend of Winston Churchill. Having been educated at 
Eton, one of England’s most exclusive independent schools, where students were groomed to 
be leaders of men, as well as the elite royal military academy Sandhurst and the universities 
of Munich and Geneva, Ian eventually took a job in October 1931 as sub-editor and journalist 
with the international news agency Reuters. It was in this capacity that Fleming was first 
drawn into the clandestine life. In March 1933, he was dispatched to Moscow to cover the 
Stalinist show trial of 6 British engineers working for Metro-Vickers who were accused of 
espionage and industrial sabotage against the Soviet Union. Interestingly, Fleming was 
chosen for the job on the strength of his Russian, which he had learned at The Tennerhof, an 
Austrian finishing school for troubled rich kids run by Major Ernan Forbes-Dennis, formerly 
an MI6 station chief in Marseilles.16 
 Invited to watch the trial from the press benches, Fleming scooped his rival journalists 
by dropping his reports from the window of the upstairs courtroom to a boy standing below in 
the freezing cold who hurried them to the nearest telegraph office. On the day of the verdict, 
showing the skills of a saboteur, he cut the wires of all the court telephones, save one, to 
ensure that he was first to deliver the news back to London.17 His inventiveness in scooping 
his competitors stunned his fellow reporters, with Linton Wells of the International News 
Service calling him a ‘pukka chap’ who had ‘given all of us a run for our money’.18 With 
typical boldness, Fleming even tried to secure an interview with Soviet leader Josef Stalin. 
Although his request was turned down, he was rewarded with a signed letter of refusal, which 
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he then used to bluff his way out of awkward situations with Soviet authorities.19 Importantly, 
his Moscow assignment impressed Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent Under-Secretary at the 
Foreign Office, who arranged for him to brief the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and key 
diplomats on what he had observed.20  
Later in the decade, with his name known in the right places, Fleming was asked by 
SIS to accompany a trade delegation to Moscow under the cover of ‘special correspondent’ 
for The Times.21 While on the job, he befriended Sefton Delmer, then a reporter for the Daily 
Express, who later became chief black propagandist for the Political Warfare Executive 
(PWE) during the Second World War.22 By his own telling, Delmer quickly realised that 
Fleming was ‘no ordinary journalist’ and was most likely ‘on some intelligence job or other’, 
for he always ‘made such a determined show of typing away whenever the Russians were 
looking’.23 During the train journey out of Russia, on the Warsaw Express, Delmer 
memorised his notes and threw them out of the window. His companion joked: ‘Why don’t 
you swallow them? That’s what all the best spies do!’24 At the border, at Negeloroje, white-
gloved customs officials took a particular interest in Fleming, escorting him into a private 
room to carry out a full body strip search. Whereas they ‘hardly glanced’ at Delmer’s 
luggage, they ‘took everything out of [Fleming’s] bags, examined the valises themselves for 
double bottoms, and held everything up to the light’.25 Before the ordeal was over, they had 
seized a box of Russian condoms from his luggage, which he was transporting to government 
scientists for testing. ‘You should have swallowed them’, muttered Delmer.26 Touché.  
Back in London, Fleming produced a report entitled ‘Russia’s Strengths: Some 
Cautionary Notes’. In it, he praised Russian military strength – claiming that ‘these tough, 
grey-faced little men are a vastly different force from the ill-equipped gun fodder of 1914’ – 
but warned against relying on Stalin as an ally, explaining that he ‘would not hesitate to stab 
us in the back the moment it suited’ him. The ‘threat of a territorial world war’, he wrote 
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prophetically, ‘should not blind us to the ideological struggle which will have to come one 
day’.27 Interestingly, while The Times dismissed the report and declined to publish it, the 
intelligence community was impressed. At the outbreak of the war, having shown an aptitude 
for the business of defending the realm, Fleming was headhunted by John Godfrey, the softly 
spoken, but always demanding, Director of Naval Intelligence, to become his personal 
assistant with the rank of lieutenant. As befitting the clubbable nature of British intelligence 
at this time, he was recruited over lunch in the grill at the luxury Carlton Hotel on the corner 
of Haymarket and Pall Mall.28   
 
II 
 
 
Quickly promoted to commander, with three gold stripes on his sleeve, Fleming found 
himself at the heart of the British intelligence machine. As the intelligence arm of the 
Admiralty, the Naval Intelligence Division (NID) was a hub of cryptographers, cartographers, 
interrogators, and attachés.29 In his role, Fleming communicated with agents in Occupied 
territory; studied purloined documents and maps; monitored German radio broadcasts; 
coordinated aerial reconnaissance to locate enemy vessels; handled press enquiries, keeping 
enterprising journalists off the scent; and read transcripts of interrogations of spies and 
captured German naval officers.  
Sometimes, it was Fleming himself who performed the interrogations. 
Unconventional at best, his favoured method for gleaning information was to dress the 
detainee in civvies and take him to Scott’s, a seafood restaurant considered to be one of the 
most glamorous in the West End of London, where they would enjoy cordon bleu cooking 
and the finest wines. On one occasion, an unwitting waiter eavesdropped on the conversation 
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and, alarmed by the hushed tones being exchanged in German, telephoned Scotland Yard. 
The next thing Fleming knew, he and his guest, a German U-Boat Commander, who was 
spilling secrets and too drunk to care, were encircled by Special Branch officers and bundled 
into an armoured vehicle. Comically, the ordeal only ended when a senior figure from the 
Admiralty could be found to authenticate Fleming’s identity and version of events.30 It has 
since been reported that it was in this same restaurant that Fleming discovered the dry 
martini, ‘shaken not stirred’, which would become 007’s drink of choice.31    
Fleming was much more than an assistant at NID. His desk, 17F, which overlooked 
Horse Guards Parade, was six feet from the door to Godfrey’s oak panelled office, so as to be 
within earshot and instant call of his chief. No one entered without his permission – not even 
the Prime Minister.32 What Godfrey knew, Fleming knew: ‘My idea was that I would tell Ian 
everything so that if anything happened to me there would be one man who would know what 
was going on – he could ensure the continuity of the department’.33 Elsewhere, Godfrey 
remarked that ‘Ian should have been the D.N.I and I his naval adviser’.34 Such was Fleming’s 
elevated status, he even had the power to read messages meant for his boss and reply to the 
sender: ‘No importance – 17F’.35 
With his easy manners, charm, and social confidence, plus a personality that made 
him as much at home with thinkers as with men of action, he became Godfrey’s designated 
liaison with a range of secret government departments. These included the PWE, the Security 
Service (MI5), SIS, the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park, 
and the Special Operations Executive (SOE), whose trainers he later boasted taught him how 
to kill a person by biting the back of their neck.36 Impressively, he was afforded the privilege 
of being ‘indoctrinated’ into the so-called Ultra secret, the codename for the breaking of the 
German Enigma machine. Nothing in Whitehall was guarded more closely; indeed, only half 
of Winston Churchill’s War Cabinet knew the secret, which was kept hidden for some three 
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decades after the end of the war.37 Fleming’s Admiralty diaries – still classified but shown to 
Graham Moore, the screenplay writer of the 2014 film The Imitation Game – reveal that he 
devised operations based on Bletchley intelligence and had dealings with Alan Turing, the 
Cambridge mathematician who was instrumental in breaking the Enigma codes.38 
Remarkably, he also chaired meetings of Britain’s senior intelligence assessment body, the 
JIC, when the official chairman Bill Cavendish-Bentinck was unavailable.39 In short, he was 
in the inner sanctum, which was no mean feat given the cloistered and closed nature of 
British intelligence at the time.40  
While his primary job was to be Godfrey’s eyes and ears in Whitehall, Fleming did on 
occasion get out into the field, although given the sensitive knowledge in his possession, he 
was understandably banned from the front line, where the risk of capture was high. In early 
June 1940, with the capitulation of France all but certain, he travelled to a grand château in 
the Loire Valley where Admiral Jean-François Darlan, commander-in-chief of the French 
Navy, was taking temporary shelter. His assignment – on the Prime Minister’s orders, no less 
– was to persuade Darlan to hand over the French fleet, the fourth largest navy in the world, 
and sail it to England. To tempt the proud and notoriously prickly admiral, an Anglophone 
whose great-grandfather had died at the Battle of Trafalgar, Fleming suggested to his 
superiors the idea of trading the Isle of Wight to the French for the duration of the war. As 
Ben Macintyre has written, one can only imagine how inhabitants of the island would have 
reacted to waking up under the French flag.41 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the scheme was 
rejected. Before a deal about the French fleet could be struck, the Luftwaffe began bombing 
the château and the two men were forced to flee. By late June, France had surrendered and 
with no agreement in place, the British had no option but to shell and torpedo the precious 
armada to prevent it from falling into Nazi hands.42 
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A born adventurer who was easily bored and perpetually restless, Fleming found a 
natural home in naval intelligence, which encouraged the blue skies thinking that he loved. 
Not content with ‘passive’ intelligence work, he enjoyed developing crazy schemes to outfox 
and beat the Germans – ideas from a rich imagination that would later be put to similar use in 
devising the plot lines for his Bond novels. Godfrey later opined that Fleming possessed a 
‘marked flair’ for planning operations.43 In August 1942, prior to the Dieppe Raid, he 
proposed sinking a giant slab of concrete with men inside it into the English Channel. In the 
submerged pillbox, the men would watch the port using a periscope.44 This idea was rejected, 
but others were approved. For example, worried that Nazi frogmen had fixed radar devices on 
wrecked vessels along the Kent Coast, Fleming successfully convinced the Admiralty to send 
its own divers to reconnoitre the sites.45  
From declassified records, we know that Fleming was involved in the planning of 
Operation Mincemeat. This mission involved the successful attempt to disguise the 
impending Allied invasion of Sicily, by floating off the Spanish coast, as if he had died in a 
plane crash, the body of a dead tramp dressed as a Royal Marines officer carrying faked 
documents that pointed to an Allied attack on the eastern Mediterranean. Hitler fell for the 
ruse completely.46 We also know that Fleming was the brainchild of ‘Operation Ruthless’. 
The objective of this mission was to steal a German naval coding machine. The plan was that 
the RAF would capture a German bomber, staff it with a German-speaking crew in Luftwaffe 
uniforms, and stage a crash landing by the French coast. With this, a German rescue vessel 
would come to the scene, whereupon the fake flight team would kill the unsuspecting crew, 
dump the bodies overboard, and then make haste for England with the precious cryptographic 
cargo in their possession. In a memo to Godfrey, Fleming claimed that one of the counterfeit 
airmen would need to be a ‘tough bachelor, able to swim’ – an early prototype of 007 
perhaps.47 
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With naval Enigma signals still to be being decoded, Turing was said to be delighted 
at the prospect of the ‘pinch’. Preparations were made. Lord Beaverbrook provided a Dornier 
plane shot down in Scotland, over the Firth of Forth, while Fleming gave the flight team a 
cover story in the event the operation failed: ‘Attackers story will be that it was done for a 
lark by a group of young hot-heads who thought the war was too tame and wanted to have a 
go at the Germans…This will prevent suspicions that the party was after more valuable booty 
than a rescue boat’.48 At the eleventh hour, with a crew on standby and Fleming personally 
supervising preparations in Dover, the operation was cancelled due to bad weather. 
Moreover, concerns had been raised about whether suitable German craft were operating in 
the area. In his diary, Fleming wrote that prized codebreakers ‘Turing and [Peter] Twinn 
came to me like undertakers cheated of a nice corpse…all in a stew about the cancellation of 
Operation Ruthless’.49  
Operation Ruthless left Fleming with an idea: naval intelligence needed some hard 
men who could be sent into occupied territory ahead of the forwarding allied troops to steal 
valuable loot from under the enemy’s nose.50 Accordingly, he created the ‘30 Unit Assault 
Squad’ (30AU), an elite team of authorised pirates and thieves trained in key commando 
skills from parachuting, scuba diving, operating small boats, setting booby traps, and 
withstanding interrogation, to close-quarter combat with knives, knuckledusters and silenced 
pistols.51  
Nicknamed the ‘Red Indians’, because their dangerous missions resembled the Native 
American hunting expeditions depicted in Hollywood westerns, Fleming managed the unit 
from London, issuing shopping lists of specialist material such as ciphers, codebooks, and 
weapon designs. Totalling 300 men and 25 officers by V-E Day, this rag-tag collection of 
tough soldiers and spies captured some significant bounties. Before Operation Torch, the 
Allied landings in Vichy-French North Africa, the team finally bagged Turing an Enigma 
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machine. Prior to the Normandy landings, the commandos procured vital intelligence on Nazi 
U-Boat pens along the northern French coast. After D-Day, they used high-speed Jeeps to 
race to enemy encampments before the retreating Germans could destroy high-grade 
documents and equipment. At the port city of Kiel, on Germany’s Baltic Sea coast, they 
found the blueprints for a sophisticated machine designed to explode beach fortifications, 
known as ‘Cleopatra’. They also grabbed a single person submarine with the rotting corpse of 
a crewman still inside, his lifeless eye stuck to the periscope.52 Most impressively, in May 
1945, they ransacked Tambach Castle, a Nazi outpost deep in the forests of Württemberg, 
capturing 100 tons of operational logs, war diaries and administrative records of the German 
Navy, dating back to the Franco-Prussian War.53 According to 30AU member Robert 
Harling, the haul was so large that half-a-dozen 3-tonne lorries were needed to transport it to 
the port in Hamburg, where a fishing boat was then chartered to deliver it London.54 Wartime 
naval intelligence veteran Donald McCormick has estimated that together these raids, carried 
out by men who were deaf to danger and had nine lives, ‘enabled thousands of lives to be 
saved, probably tens of thousands’.55    
 
 
III 
 
 
Fleming’s most important wartime contribution involved his dealings with US intelligence. 
Throughout the war, he made numerous trips across the Atlantic to liaise with counterparts in 
the American Office of Naval Intelligence. During the early years of the war, these visits 
were to a large extent about trying to convince the Americans – not yet a spying superpower 
– to take intelligence more seriously.56 At the time, Washington did not possess a permanent 
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espionage agency. Spying was viewed as being ‘un-American’, as evidenced by the decision 
to abolish the codebreaking organisation the ‘Black Chamber’ in 1929, which was 
accompanied by the famous admonition of US Secretary of State Henry Stimson that 
‘gentlemen do not read other gentlemen’s mail’.57 In contrast, Britain’s SIS had been 
established in 1909 and had roots dating back to Queen Elizabeth I.58 One of Fleming’s 
earliest trips to the US was to present the Americans with mounting evidence of an Axis 
espionage network operating in the country. Among the spies British intelligence had 
identified was a woman who was known to patronize the basement bar of the Barbizon Plaza 
Hotel next to Central Park in New York City. ‘Keep away from her and see your friends do, 
too’, warned Fleming. ‘I am told’, he added, in a characterization that brings to mind the 
degrading representation of women that he would adopt in the Bond novels, ‘that her 
bedroom conduct is totally reprehensible and unrewarding’.59  
By the spring of 1941, known only to a few members of President Roosevelt’s 
administration, Washington and London had agreed to greater intelligence sharing.60 As a 
result, Godfrey and Fleming travelled to the US in May on a Top Secret mission to fine tune 
the arrangements. The trip was eventful. An overnight layover in Lisbon saw them kill time 
at the Estoril Casino, where Fleming gambled away his escudos at the chemin-de-fer table 
against two Portuguese businessmen he suspected might be Nazi spies. ‘While there’, he later 
recorded, ‘I recognized some German agents, and I thought it would be a brilliant coup to 
play with them, break them, take their money’.61 Fleming’s plan to win the game and deal a 
blow to Hitler’s war chest failed, but the episode was the inspiration for Bond’s deadly game 
of baccarat against the Benzedrine-sniffing villain Le Chiffre in Casino Royale (1952). The 
next day, the two men donned civilian suits and crossed the Atlantic on a six-engine Dixie-
Clipper, hoping to sneak into New York unnoticed. However, as they disembarked, a swarm 
of paparazzi was there to photograph a fellow passenger, the Italian fashion designer Madame 
14 
 
Elsa Schiaparelli who had arrived to open a haute couture establishment in the city. That 
evening, a picture of the couturier, with the secret spy chief and his personal assistant in the 
background, featured on the front page of The New York Times. Thankfully, they were not 
identified.62 
In New York, Fleming was introduced to the Canadian-born millionaire industrialist 
and former lightweight boxing champion Sir William Stephenson, Britain’s top intelligence 
official in the US, who headed the British Security Coordination (BSC). Headquartered on 
the 36th floor of the Rockefeller Center, the BSC was the operational and liaison arm of SIS 
in the Americas. With his contacts in American industry and government, Stephenson worked 
covertly to mobilise pro-British opinion and convince the American people that a war with 
Hitler’s Germany was worth fighting. To this end, the BSC planted anti-German stories in the 
US media and waged a harassment campaign against pro-Nazi and isolationist groups. 
Fleming struck an instant rapport with the diminutive Stephenson – or ‘Little Bill’ as he was 
known – and indeed later published a letter in The Sunday Times claiming that Bond was a 
‘highly romanticised’ roman-à-clef of the spy chief.63 A cryptic nod to the BSC also featured 
in Casino Royale, when Bond tells Mathis that his first kill in pursuit of his ‘00’ status was a 
‘Japanese cipher expert cracking our codes on the thirty-sixth floor of the R.C.A. building in 
the Rockefeller centre’.64 
Through Stephenson, Fleming was schooled at ‘Camp X’, a paramilitary training 
facility on the northwestern shore of Lake Ontario. Reportedly, he was excellent with a sub-
machine gun and achieved top marks in an underwater exercise that involved attaching a 
limpet mine, undetected, in frogmen-infested waters, to the hull of an oil tanker.65 He also 
successfully planted a fake bomb inside a Toronto power station; while the other trainees 
made botched attempts using the cover of nightfall or by donning disguises, Fleming 
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succeeded by wearing his best threads and arranging a meeting with the managing director, 
posing as a visiting British engineer.66  
From New York, Godfrey and Fleming travelled to Washington, D.C. to meet with 
Stephenson’s inseparable friend and companion in intelligence, the imposing General 
William Donovan, who Stephenson called ‘Big Bill’. President Roosevelt had recently 
selected Donovan to head the office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), a new civilian 
agency to oversee US intelligence collection and analytic efforts. Evidence tantalizingly 
suggests that whilst in the nation’s capital Fleming wrote the memorandum that evolved into 
the blueprint for the COI and its two successors, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and 
the CIA, created in 1942 and 1947 respectively. According to NID veteran Patrick Beesly, 
‘Fleming drafted plans which led to the creation of the O.S.S.’67 Elsewhere, Fleming’s 
childhood friend Ivar Bryce, who worked for Stephenson in Washington, has written that 
Fleming penned the memorandum – ‘under armed guard around the clock’ – in just over two 
days in long-hand in a room in the new annex of the British Embassy.68 Dated 27 June 1941 
and stretching to some 70 pages, the document outlined how a new US agency should be 
structured and staffed, drawing heavily from the British model and experience. ‘For what 
they are worth’, the opening line read, ‘I have prepared a few notes on some steps which will 
have to be taken at an early stage in order that your organisation can be set up in time to meet 
war before Christmas’.69 It is fascinating to note that Fleming worked on the assumption that 
the US would join the war ‘before Christmas’, which is precisely what happened following 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December.  
Well aware that spying attracted a certain squeamishness in the US, Fleming was 
tactful in the document to avoid anything that smacked of creating an American Gestapo or 
might give the impression of con men and mindless assassins, thriving on danger and killing 
at will.70 Fearful of the reaction from what he considered old-maidish congressmen who still 
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viewed intelligence as a dirty business, there was no hint of American intelligence following 
what he called the ‘Sidney Reilly School of Espionage’, in honour of the master spy who 
worked for British intelligence after the Bolshevik Revolution.71 Elsewhere in the document, 
he suggested that publishing magnate Henry Luce of Time magazine would be a good choice 
to lead the organisation. He also warned that ‘cajolery’ and ‘dragooning’ would be needed to 
gain the cooperation and trust of rival agencies, including J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI and the 
State Department.72 In recognition of his efforts, Donovan gave Fleming a six-round cylinder 
.38-caliber Colt Police Positive Revolver, inscribed with the words ‘For Special Services’.73 
In the novel Casino Royale, Bond keeps a similar handgun, with a sawn rather than full-
length barrel, under his pillow while he sleeps.  
The motivating factors that led to the creation of the CIA in 1947 have been much 
debated in US intelligence literature, with some suggesting that it grew out of the failure to 
forestall the assault on Pearl Harbor and the desire to prevent another surprise attack, and 
others linking its genesis to the Cold War and President Truman’s eagerness to counter the 
menacing expansionism of the Soviet Union.74 While it would be inaccurate to call Fleming 
the ‘father’ of the CIA or to suggest that his blueprint was the decisive factor, it is clear that 
his contribution should not be overlooked, for he was involved in the discussions at precisely 
the moment when ideas that led to its establishment were being formed. 
 
IV 
 
 
Following demobilisation in May 1945, Fleming contemplated taking a job with MI5 or SIS, 
a path taken by many wartime intelligence officers.75 Instead, he became Foreign Manager of 
Kemsley newspapers, which at the time compromised some thirty newspapers and whose 
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flagship was the prestigious Sunday Times. He took the position in preference to continued 
formal intelligence work because he successfully bartered two months of paid holiday, giving 
him to time to fulfil two ambitions: to a build a house called Goldeneye in Jamaica, a country 
he fell in love with during a wartime U-Boat conference; and to write the ‘spy story to end all 
spy stories’76. 
However, Fleming never truly left the intelligence world. When his commission in the 
Royal Naval Reserve came up for renewal in 1951, he appealed unsuccessfully to the NID for 
a special exemption from the mandatory fortnight’s training, writing suggestively: ‘I am 
engaged throughout the year in running a worldwide intelligence organisation…I also carry 
out a number of tasks on behalf of a department of the Foreign Office’.77 At Kemsley, he 
launched the ‘Mercury’ news service, named after the Roman messenger god. Officially, 
Mercury provided articles across the Kemsley Empire; unofficially, it was a nest of spies that 
supplied incidental intelligence.78 Indeed, Fleming had a canary-yellow world map on his 
office wall with pins and dotted lines demonstrating the locations and reach of the agents he 
was running.79 Many of the ‘journalists’ he sent around the world had intelligence 
backgrounds, whilst others were on SIS’s payroll under the cover of being foreign 
correspondents. Cedric Salter, who he sent to Barcelona, was SOE. Donald McCormick, a 
stringer in Tangier, had been in Naval Intelligence; so too Stephen Coulter. Anthony Terry, 
the newspaper’s man in Bonn, was an intelligence officer in Vienna and Berlin. Indeed, 
according to Terry’s then wife, Fleming had personally arranged her husband’s cover in 
Germany.80 According to McCormick, correspondents were required to submit ‘Sitreps’ – the 
name given to the wartime Situation Reports Centre that collated intelligence from abroad – 
providing information about what was happening in their corner of the globe. At Fleming’s 
discretion, this ‘eyes only’ material was ‘passed on to branches of Intelligence as and when 
this seemed justified’.81  
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For the remainder of his life, Fleming enjoyed informal contacts with many 
intelligence personnel. He and his wife, Ann, mingled with renowned culture critic Malcolm 
Muggeridge, who had worked for SIS during the war, stationed in Portuguese Mozambique. 
Despite their mutual connections to wartime spying, Muggeridge was less than 
complimentary about Fleming, writing in his diary after one evening with the couple at 
Victoria Square in London that it was ‘difficult to see why Ann fell for him’, adding that Ian 
was a ‘slob’ who treated her with ‘old-fashioned playfulness, with remarks like “Now don’t 
you go worrying your pretty little head about that”, which, oddly, she appeared to like’.82 
Muggeridge later angered Fleming’s family by publicly attacking the spy writer within a few 
months of his death, calling him an ‘Etonian Mickey Spillane’ and describing Bond as 
nothing more than the author’s ‘squalid…glamorized view of himself’.83  
For Fleming, a deeper and more loyal friendship came in the form of the Scottish 
diplomat, British army Brigadier, and writer Sir Fitzroy Maclean, who is often mentioned as 
one of the inspirations for James Bond. A tall, handsome and imposing figure, dubbed 
‘Lothario in a kilt’ (on account of his fondness for Highland dress),84 Maclean had made a 
name for himself during the early part of the war as a founding member of the elite Special 
Air Service (SAS), performing daredevil exploits behind the lines in North Africa. Later, in 
1943, he was chosen as Churchill’s special envoy to liaise with Tito’s partisans in 
Yugoslavia. A man who knew no fear, whose motto in life was that it is better to live a day as 
a tiger than a year as a donkey, he has been described as a ‘real-life imperial adventurer in the 
tradition of Kim and Richard Hannay and an action man in the mould of Sir Richard Burton 
and, his own special hero, Bonnie Prince Charlie’.85 After the war, with the character of Bond 
starting to form in his mind, Fleming was in regular contact with Maclean. In Box 79 of 
Maclean’s private papers, held at the Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections Library at 
the University of Virginia, is a photograph of the two men enjoying an afternoon together in 
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the English countryside, drinking coffee.86 In May 1949, Fleming corresponded with Maclean 
over the latter’s forthcoming autobiography Eastern Approaches, encouraging the Brigadier 
to remove passages that he perceived as being too pompous. As Fleming wrote in a letter to 
the book’s publisher, Jonathan Cape, while Parts I and II were ‘beautifully written’, ‘of 
absorbing interest’, and full of ‘excellent adventure material’, Part III was ‘spoilt by the 
patronising note which Fitzroy allowed to creep in and by traces of hubris which are not in 
the tradition of such books by Englishman’.87 After publication, Fleming ensured that the 
book was positively reviewed in The Sunday Times.88  
Fleming enjoyed a close post-war friendship with former SOE Head, Major-General 
Sir Colin Gubbins. One of the interesting consequences of this friendship was that it gave 
Fleming a voice in the secret world. In July 1949, he urged Gubbins to write a popular history 
of SOE, commenting that ‘The work of SOE really deserves such a monument’.89  Such a 
book, he explained, would also serve as a ‘stopper’ to some of the ‘dreadful stories’ that had 
appeared about the organisation since the end of the war, which included accusations that 
SOE leadership had sent scores of its own agents, including women officers, to almost certain 
death, either through rank incompetence or, more sinisterly, in the service of playing a higher 
game, such as protecting the secret that the British had blown the German double-cross 
network.90 Fleming pressed Gubbins several times about the book, declaring that The Sunday 
Times would pay a ‘quite considerable fee’ for the serialisation rights and commenting ‘you 
are the only person who could do this and who would also have the confidence of the 
Ministry of Defence as far as security matters were concerned’.91 Although Gubbins 
ultimately declined, Fleming’s novel suggestion was raised among numerous senior 
authorities, including Lord Selborne, the former Minister of Economic Warfare and political 
head of SOE.92 Over the 1950s the idea of official public history germinated and flourished, 
with a breakthrough volume on SOE activities in France, authored by M.R.D. Foot, 
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eventually being published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office in 1966.93 Indirectly, 
therefore, Fleming played a part in breaking down the taboo in Britain about discussing 
official intelligence work in public, a shift in intelligence culture that he would press still 
further with his own spy fiction. 
Fleming socialised at Godfrey’s 36 Club, named after the DNI’s official residence at 
36 Curzon Street, which has been described by Andrew Lycett as a ‘think-tank for 
intelligence honed brains’ and the preferred watering hole for naval intelligence officers.94 
Here, Godfrey tried unsuccessfully to convince his old assistant to write his biography, 
eventually completed in 1970 by fellow NID veteran Patrick Beesly.95 Fleming did, however, 
complete writing tasks for other intelligence professionals. In 1957, he wrote the preface to 
The Education of a Poker Player by notorious US cryptologist Herbert Yardley, author of the 
1931 tell-all book The American Black Chamber, which had outraged American authorities.96 
Also in 1957, at the request of former MI5 Director-General Sir Percy Sillitoe, he published 
an account of how the International Diamond Security Organisation, which had been run by 
Sillitoe after his retirement from MI5, had stopped the illicit diamond trade from Sierra 
Leone. Entitled The Diamond Smugglers, the book was written in two weeks in Tangiers, 
based on ten days of interviews with ex-MI5 officer John Collard who had been recruited by 
De Beers to break the smuggling ring. To protect Collard’s identity, he was given the 
pseudonym ‘John Blaize’.97 In 1962, Fleming wrote the introduction to The Quiet Canadian, 
Montgomery Hyde’s authorised biography of William Stephenson.98 He and Stephenson, a 
fellow resident of Jamaica, had remained good friends since the war. Along with playwright 
Noël Coward, newspaper proprietor Lord Beaverbrook, and old SIS hand Sir William 
Wiseman, they lived on the exclusive north shore of the island, overlooking Montego Bay, 
and were known as ‘Jamaica’s Yale Club’. 
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One of the closest relationships cultivated by Fleming after the war was with CIA 
Director Allen Dulles, who presided over the Agency during its purported ‘Golden Age’ of 
covert action, from 1953 to 1961.99 They first met in London at a dinner party arranged by 
some members of British intelligence. ‘We had quite a night of it’, Dulles recollected some 
years later. ‘Fleming was a brilliant and witty talker, with ideas on everything. Before we got 
through, we had pretty well torn orthodox intelligence to pieces… ‘Ever since that night, I 
kept in constant touch with him’.100  
That the two men became such good friends is not altogether surprising. Both were 
the products of elite education with family traditions of political engagement in public office. 
Dulles was related to three US Secretaries of State – his grandfather, John Watson Foster 
under President Benjamin Harrison; his uncle Robert Lansing under President Woodrow 
Wilson; and his brother John Foster Dulles, who served President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
alongside him and in whose shadow he believed he laboured. Educated at Princeton, where 
he made Phi Beta Kappa, he became a Wall Street corporate lawyer, practicing for 15 years, 
before joining the OSS. As discussed earlier, Fleming similarly came from a family of 
distinguished heritage and power.   
The parallels between the two men did not end there. Both Dulles and Fleming knew 
everyone, would meet everyone, and enjoyed peripatetic lives of travel and adventure. 
Beneath their charm and friendly manner, both possessed an emotional coldness, played by 
their own rules, and were single-minded and manipulative in getting what they wanted, 
including female company. Dulles had a notorious wandering eye and pursued a remarkable 
sequence of ‘Other Women’, including Queen Frederika of Greece with whom he was once 
reportedly caught red-handed in a dressing room next to his CIA office.101 Fleming was also a 
serial womaniser, much like his fictitious creation; from sleeping with the wives of aristocrats 
to contracting an STD from a prostitute, he did it all. More importantly, both Dulles and 
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Fleming were passionate believers in the importance of defeating communism and strong 
advocates of the righteousness and necessity of covert operations in pursuit of this goal. In 
short, they were naturally drawn to each other.   
James Bond was one of the Dulles’ guilty pleasures. The spymaster had a complete 
set of signed hardback 007 novels in his library and, intriguingly, even sent typed notes about 
them to fellow Bond enthusiast President John F. Kennedy.102 In public, he often talked 
glowingly about 007 – his favourite quip being that he wished the CIA had half a dozen 
James Bonds.103 As Dulles later confessed, ‘some of the professionals working for me [at 
CIA]…never could quite understand this weakness of the boss’, calling him a ‘bit soft-
headed’.104 The reason for the ‘weakness’ was actually rather simple. Dulles liked Bond 
because the series contained the right sort of takeaways about spying and drew the public’s 
attention away from what was really going on. Dedicated, loyal, and above all patriotic 
agents that kept the world safe, with high risk and little reward, was the image of the spy 
business that Dulles, the consummate espionage marketer, wanted the public to have. ‘Bond’, 
Dulles enthused on one occasion, ‘[has] got patriotic feeling. He’s part of the Service. That’s 
something I tried to build up when I was the Director – esprit de corps’.105 In Bond, the end 
justified the means – and the means were fun. This was precisely what Dulles wanted the 
public to believe. The more people believed that secret intelligence was of vital national 
importance, carried out by dashing and heroic men like Bond, the fewer awkward questions 
there would be about what was really going on, which, in Dulles’s era, included the 
fomenting of coups in Iran and Guatemala and the controversial subsidising of student 
associations and other notionally ‘private’ groups.106 
So highly did Dulles value Bond’s propagandising of the intelligence mission that 
when, in 1963, word spread that Fleming was contemplating retiring or even killing off 007, 
he wrote to author in protest: ‘I hope you have not really destroyed our old friend and 
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colleague James Bond’.107 Envious of British success in the spy fiction field, Dulles later 
became fascinated with the idea of an American James Bond. Eventually, he turned to his old 
Executive Assistant and CIA covert operations specialist E. Howard Hunt, a talented novelist 
who had won the prestigious Guggenheim Fellowship in 1946 to support his writing, to see 
what could be done. Using the pseudonym David St. John, Hunt duly produced a series of 
spy thrillers featuring the Bond-like CIA hero, Peter Ward, between 1965 and 1971. Sadly for 
Dulles, the nine novels never gained the same level of popularity and influence as 007. 
Despite Hunt’s literary abilities, the books soon became overshadowed by his more famous 
exploits as the Nixon aide who recruited the burglars and organised the break-in at the 
Democratic Party headquarters in the Watergate complex in 1972. After the scandal broke 
and Hunt was jailed for his involvement, the Peter Ward series was repackaged with the 
legend ‘Convicted Watergate Conspirator’ emblazoned above Hunt’s name, now-revealed as 
the true author of the books. In the New York Review of Books, Gore Vidal assessed Hunt’s 
collected works and referred to him as the ‘Shakespeare of the CIA’, although the accolade is 
clearly meant disparagingly since Vidal is characteristically scathing of his subject’s ‘literary 
competence’.108 
Dulles was captivated by ‘Q-Branch’ – the fictional ‘toy shop’ in the Bond novels and 
films where scientists in white coats worked through the night to develop life-saving gadgetry 
for agents in the field. In an interview for Life magazine in August 1964, he made the 
remarkable admission that as DCI he had been desperate to emulate Bond’s gadget-powered 
success and had even tasked his engineers at CIA with trying to replicate as many of these 
fantastical bits of kit as physics would allow. According to Dulles, he had been particularly 
keen to reproduce the pocket size homing beacon which, in the film Goldfinger (1964), Sean 
Connery’s Bond hides in the villain’s Rolls Royce to track its whereabouts: ‘I put my people 
in CIA to work on this as a serious project, but they came up with the answer that it had too 
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many bugs in it. The device really didn’t work very well when the enemy got into a crowded 
city’.109 In a wonderful case of life imitating art, Dulles reported that his scientists fared much 
better when it came to developing Rosa Klebb’s infamous poison-tipped dagger shoe, from 
the novel From Russia With Love (1957). Sadly, he did not reveal whether the fatal footwear 
was ever used in the field.  
Although the evidence is patchy, there are beguiling hints that Dulles sought 
Fleming’s counsel on operational matters. On 13 March 1960, Fleming wangled himself an 
invitation to the Georgetown home of then presidential candidate John F. Kennedy, who was 
hosting a dinner party. The guest list for the evening was a veritable ‘who’s who’ of well-
connected Washingtonians. Along for the evening were senior CIA man John Bross and 
syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop who was secretly part of the CIA’s cultural Cold War 
apparatus, penning articles that criticised communism while celebrating American 
interventionism overseas.  
Fuelled by brandy, post-prandial conversation was particularly lively, with Kennedy 
asking Fleming, in the spirit of jest, ‘what would Bond do’ about Cuban revolutionary leader 
Fidel Castro? Never one to pass up a challenge, Fleming declared that killing Castro was not 
enough; his regime had to be tainted in the eyes of the Cuban people. To achieve this, he 
proposed a three-fold plan. Stage one would involve the CIA flooding the streets of Havana 
with bundles of counterfeit money, accompanied by notes saying ‘compliments of the United 
States’. Following this, high-altitude American spy planes would drop pamphlets out of the 
sky claiming that radioactivity, caused by atomic testing, was attracted to men with beards 
and caused impotence. To protect their virility, Fleming suggested, the barbudos would be 
forced to shave their macho facial hair, thus severing a symbolic link to the revolution. The 
plan would culminate with the CIA projecting some sort of large religious object over the 
Havana skyline, ideally a crucifix, to imply divine disapproval of the communist regime. 
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Enraptured by Fleming’s imaginative suggestions, Kennedy and his guests roared with 
laughter.110 
The following day, at CIA headquarters, Bross told Dulles about Fleming’s seemingly 
harebrained ideas. To his astonishment, rather than see the funny side, Dulles took them with 
deadly seriousness, not least since they resonated with schemes already being formulated by 
the Agency’s Technical Services and more broadly echoed his philosophy that 
unconventional thinking would be needed to break the stalemate with the Soviet Union and 
win the Cold War. Anxious to discover more, Dulles tried to get Fleming to Langley, but the 
author had already left Washington.111 Sadly this is where the story ends, at least as far as 
publicly available sources exist.  
While it would be foolish to infer from this evidence that Fleming was the architect of 
JFK’s Cuba policy, it is clear that his blue skies thinking was not out of place as far as real 
policy was concerned and may even have influenced the various schemes that were adopted 
to try to undermine the Cuban revolution. In the 1960s, the CIA’s covert actions against 
Castro – Operation Mongoose – bore an uncanny resemblance to Fleming’s dinner party 
suggestions. During the Church Committee hearings in the mid-1970s into CIA misdeeds and 
dirty tricks, it was revealed in public testimony that the Agency, very much in the spirit of 
Fleming, had considered shooting starshells into the sky from a US submarine off Havana, to 
convince the locals that the Second Coming was at hand.112 While we may never know 
Fleming’s exact contribution to Mongoose, if indeed there was one at all, it is interesting to 
note that the Soviets focused on the relationship between Fleming and the CIA in their 
propaganda war with Washington. ‘Fleming’s best friend is Allen Dulles’, the Soviet 
newspaper Izvestia reported in April 1962. ‘Dulles’, it went on, ‘even attempted (but 
unsuccessfully) to try methods recommended by Fleming in his books. American 
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propagandists must be in a bad way if they have recourse to the help of an English retired spy 
turned mediocre writer’. 113  
In the later Bond novels, appreciative of Dulles’s friendship and public advocacy of 
James Bond, Fleming slipped complimentary references to the CIA into the text, which in 
turn were welcomed by the Agency as it sought to improve its public profile after the Bay of 
Pigs fiasco in April 1961, when a group of Cuban émigrés, backed by the CIA, had failed to 
provoke an uprising to bring about Castro’s removal.114 In Thunderball (1961), for example, 
Bond’s boss ‘M’ enthuses: ‘We’ve teamed up with the CIA to cover the world. Allen Dulles 
is putting every man he’s got onto it and so am I’.115 In You Only Live Twice (1964), Dulles is 
referred to benevolently as the ‘old fox’.116 And, in The Man with the Golden Gun (1965), 
Fleming even promotes Dulles’s new book. Recuperating from his duel with Scaramanga, the 
text notes that Bond was ‘sitting in his chair, a towel around his waist, reading Allen Dulles’s 
The Craft of Intelligence’.117  
The two men remained close friends, publicly scratching each other’s backs, right up 
until the fifty-six year old author died of a heart attack on the morning of 12 August 1964. In 
June of that year, Redbook magazine, then described as a ‘magazine for young adults’, 
published an informal dialogue between them in which Dulles admitted he was pleased that 
Fleming had written about CIA officers in his Bond novels, particularly through the character 
of Felix Leiter, even if they were portrayed as junior partners in the transatlantic alliance: 
‘You were kind enough to begin introducing some of our CIA people into your books. In 
subordinate positions, of course. I say this very politely, you understand.’118 Fleming paid 
Dulles the ultimate compliment by revealing he had written the former DCI into his next 
Bond novel ‘Comparing you favourably with your successor [John McCone].119 In the piece, 
the two friends opined on a range of intelligence matters, including the problems of running 
intelligence agencies under the glare of a free press and the value of allowing prisoner 
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exchanges, as had occurred in 1962 between American U-2 pilot Gary Powers and Soviet 
KGB Colonel Rudolf Abel at the now infamous Glienicke Bridge in Berlin. They also 
discussed the merits of hiring women as agents, as well as the security risks posed by civil 
servants whose ‘sexual perversions’ (Fleming’s phrase) could leave them vulnerable to 
blackmail. Unfortunately, it would be the last time the two parleyed together in public. After 
Fleming’s death, Dulles gave a eulogy in Life magazine on 28 August 1964, in which he 
spoke of their special acquaintance and clear influences upon each other’s work. With playful 
admiration, he concluded by saying that ‘Fleming’s imagination could go even higher’ than a 
U2 spy-plane, which operated at some 70,000 feet.120 It was a gesture that his friend would 
have recognised and appreciated.    
 
V 
 
It is time to put to bed the notion that Ian Fleming, in marked contrast to le Carré and other 
cerebral chroniclers of espionage who served in British intelligence, was an insignificant or 
juvenile actor in the spy business. Based on the available historical record, the reality is that 
his dealings with the real world of spies were far more extensive and important than has been 
acknowledged, encompassing not only the war years but also the inter-war period and the 
early Cold War.  
As Godfrey’s right hand man, he was given a remarkable licence to coordinate with a 
host of secret government departments. At NID, he was not just a desk officer; he was the 
desk officer, who knew everything and everyone. Despite being notorious for their 
unwelcoming attitude toward interlopers from other corners of Whitehall, these departments 
saw him as Godfrey did, as a good mixer with outstanding administrative skills and bundles 
of initiative. Indeed, his former colleague Donald McCormick has written boldly that ‘He 
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would have made an admirable head of the British Secret Service’.121 Throughout the war, 
Fleming was valued for his willingness to depart from traditional, linear, ways of thinking. 
While outlandish and worthy of fiction, the plans that he dreamed up to defeat Hitler earned 
him respect as creative-problem solver. So too his establishment of the 30 Unit Assault 
Squad, the dirty dozen of men who lived for danger and achieved notable successes in the 
lead up to, and in aid of, D-Day. He was – to quote Churchill – a ‘corkscrew thinker’; 
someone who believed that winning the war would require unpredictable behaviour. Allen 
Dulles was built the same way; hence his eagerness to seek Fleming’s counsel, even in the 
face of raised eyebrows and mild amusement among his colleagues at CIA.  
Looking at Fleming’s intelligence ‘career’ as a whole, we are reminded of Scott 
Lucas’s concept of the ‘state-private network’, describing the cooperative relationship 
between the state and nominally independent civil society actors in pursuit of larger public 
goals, from intelligence gathering to consensus-building and the winning of hearts and 
minds.122 During the war, Fleming served His Majesty’s Government (the state) to defeat the 
scourge of Nazism. But, on other occasions, like in the 1930s, as a freelance spy behind the 
Iron Curtain, or in the 1960s, as a confidante of Dulles, it is clear that he had one leg on each 
side of the state-private divide. 
Through his rich interactions and experiences with the Western intelligence 
community, Fleming was able to invent a fiction rooted in the often-bizarre realities of a 
mysterious world deliberately hidden from public view. Indeed, without his involvement 
from the inside of the intelligence machine, it is hard to escape the conclusion that there 
would have been no 007, or at the very least, the franchise would have been a paler shadow 
of itself. One major reason why Bond in all its cultural forms has been so successful is 
because it is anchored in the veracity of the author’s own connections with the ‘real’ 
enterprise of intelligence. Fleming did not conceive his fictional hero amidst the lush foliage, 
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secluded nooks, and turquoise waters of his sunkissed Caribbean paradise, but in the snow-
beaten, ice-covered, streets of 1930s Moscow and the tense, smoke-filled, government offices 
of London and Washington.  
In September 1964, many intelligence officers attended Fleming’s memorial service. 
They included Fleming’s brother and wartime deception specialist Peter Fleming; poet and 
former military intelligence officer John Betjeman; NID colleague William Plomer; Bond 
producer and OSS veteran Harry Saltzman; plus several of the infamous ‘Red Indians’ such 
as Robert Harling.123 It was a fitting tribute to someone who had played the game for over 
thirty years and whose legacy in shaping public perceptions of spying and the meaning of 
intelligence continues to this day.  
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